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Developmental genetics and psychopathology: Some new feathers
for a fine old hat
WENDY JOHNSON
University of Edinburgh and University of Minnesota–Twin Cities
Abstract
Without even knowing of their existence, Mendel discovered how genes operate when they are completely penetrant, although they rarely are, at least
with respect to human personality and psychopathology; yet quantitative genetics results have conclusively demonstrated their substantial macrolevel
influence. Now we need to understand just how incompletely penetrant genes make their contributions to psychopathology. Exciting new developments in
molecular genetics and epigenetics provide new insight into gene action in principle but have been of limited value so far in understanding the emergence of
psychopathology. Some of the most helpful postulates might come from evolutionary and developmental biology and agricultural breeding experiments.
I describe the all but forgotten evolutionary mechanisms articulated by Schmalhausen, a Russian evolutionary biologist whose work was suppressed by Stalin
in the 1940s. I focus on Schmalhausen’s law, the observation that organisms living in conditions at the boundary of their tolerance in any one aspect of
existence will be vulnerable to expression of genetic liabilities related to all other aspects of existence. I show how Schmalhausen’s ideas are relevant to the
results of a century-long corn-breeding experiment and the current concepts of facilitated variation and cryptic genetic variation. I then discuss the relevance of
all of these to understanding genetic influences on personality and psychopathology.
Gregor Johan Mendel (1822–1884) is famous for having dis-
covered how genes work when they are completely penetrant
or have single observable effects in all environments typically
observed. For such genes we can do little better today to ex-
plain their action than his laws of segregation and independent
assortment, although we can provide many more details about
how these actions take place. The law of segregation states that
individuals carry two sets of genetic material, one from each
parent, and that each gamete (sex cell) receives only one set
of this material. The law of independent assortment states
that this process takes place independently for each gene.
These laws have proven to be firm enough for completely
penetrant genes that such genes are now termed Mendelian.
The major developments in genetics since Mendel’s day
surround the observation that most genes are far from com-
pletely penetrant. This lack of complete penetrance takes
many forms, including, but not limited to, small effects, mul-
tiple effects, effects that vary with genetic background, ef-
fects that vary with environmental exposure, and effects
that vary over time and developmental phase. Over the
same period, quantitative genetic studies have conclusively
demonstrated that genes have substantial macrolevel influences
on population variance in personality and psychopathology;
yet modern molecular genetic studies, which rely on substan-
tial genetic penetrance, have uncovered few if any specific
genes contributing to these traits. Thus, it is becoming evident
that most genes involved in personality and psychopathology
must be of this incompletely penetrant character.
Our challenge at this point is to understand exactly how
these incompletely penetrant genes are involved in personal-
ity and psychopathology. Many recent and exciting new de-
velopments in molecular genetics and epigenetics suggest
possibilities. For example, large regions of the genome do
not contain genes that code for the production of proteins.
The DNA in these regions was long termed junk DNA and
thought to be essentially inert. It is now clear that the DNA
in these regions includes genes with important functions in
regulating the production of proteins and the ability of protein
receptors to make use of proteins. It is also now clear that as
much as 80% of the genetic variants that have been associated
with complex diseases (whether replicable) are located in
such regions (Hindorff et al., 2009). This indicates that the
regulation of protein production is at least as important in un-
derstanding genetic influences as protein production itself.
Moreover, the human genome is not the fixed structure
with a specific number of genetic slots that we once thought.
There is considerable structural variation among human ge-
nomes, and this variation can take many forms. For example,
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it has become clear that some individuals and families carry
insertions or deletions (or both) of long stretches of DNA
that are not generally carried by most humans. Sections of
DNA can also be inverted in position on the genome so
that they are read in reverse order during transcription and
even translocated or positioned completely differently from
the usual positioning on the same or different chromosomes.
Evidence is growing that these structural variations might
contribute to psychopathology, at least when they occur de
novo (spontaneously; e.g., Sebat et al., 2007; Xu et al.,
2008), although most cases that are observed have not arisen
de novo in this way but are carried within families. Model or-
ganisms have shown that variations in the extent to which
genes are expressed are the rule rather than the exception,
with the variations dependent on both genetic background
and environmental circumstances (Le Rouzic & Carlborg,
2007; Petronis, 2001). Although these developments provide
new insight into gene action in principle, up to now they have
been of limited value in understanding the emergence of psy-
chopathology in general or with respect to specific disorders.
The Currently Prevailing Genetic Perspective
The purpose of this article is to show that we need a shift in
perspective on the meaning and interpretation of the existence
of genetic influences on psychopathology. At its most funda-
mental level, the shift needed is from thinking of genes as the
drivers of development within an environment to thinking of
genes and developmental processes as respondents to the
environment. The basis for this shift in perspective is embod-
ied in concepts from evolutionary and developmental biology
that have been with us for a long time. These ideas have sat on
the sidelines of advances in molecular genetics, like a fine but
forgotten old hat. However, new molecular genetic discover-
ies and technologies are providing new feathers that will look
good on it, and the spruced-up version with these new feath-
ers will look good on us. It is time to bring this old hat out
again: as the old expression about thinking caps suggests,
wearing a hat can set our minds for action. Thus, it is helpful
to provide some brief background on the perspective that has
underlain our recent efforts to identify the genes involved in
psychopathology.
Mendel’s work was originally published in 1866 (Mendel,
1901) but was ignored until the turn of the last century, when
it was rediscovered and quickly replicated. By that time, the
idea of evolution, as outlined in On the Origin of Species
(Darwin, 1859), had captured the minds of biologists. They
saw Mendel’s discrete world of white or purple flowers and
wrinkled or smooth peas as incompatible with the theoretical
implication of evolution that most morphological traits
should vary continuously and the empirical observation that
this is the case. The clear replication of Mendel’s observa-
tions, however, made reconciliation of the two perspectives
essential. The reconciliation that still underlies our perspec-
tive was compiled in large measure by Fisher (1918, 1930),
who showed mathematically that continuous variation could
arise from the independent actions of many discrete genetic
loci and that Mendelian genetics was consistent with evolu-
tion by natural selection. His demonstration of consistency
was so welcome and so conclusive from a mathematical per-
spective that two assumptions that underlay it went largely
unchallenged and came to be taken basically for granted as
the field of quantitative genetics emerged. These two assump-
tions were that gene actions were independent (a) of each
other and (b) of environmental circumstances. With them, in-
complete genetic penetrance could be explained as genes of
small effect, making further integration of Mendelian genet-
ics and natural selection seem unnecessary.
Fisher’s reconciliation led directly to the development in the
late 1940s of what became known as the modern evolutionary
synthesis. Augmented to recognize the role of DNA, which
was discovered afterwards, it forms the basis of the perspective
that still dominates the search for genes involved in psychopa-
thology today. It can be summarized as follows:
1. Heredity occurs through the transmission across genera-
tions of discrete units of DNA known as genes.
2. Variation transmitted across generations in this way re-
flects variation in DNA base sequence.
3. Variation in DNA base sequence results from random
combinations of existing alleles generated by sexual repro-
duction and from new DNA variants that occur acciden-
tally and spontaneously through mutation.
4. Natural selection occurs at the level of the individual and
the manifested trait, which may be affected by transactions
with symbionts and parasites.
5. Heritable variations have small effects, and evolution is
gradual but sufficient to create the large changes in the pa-
leontological record that have taken place over time.
The general interpretation of this synthesis made by most
geneticists is that there is a direct match between gene and
trait. This has been inferred to mean that genetic variation
is the basis of natural selection; genes that are present are ex-
pressed in ways that can be specified with respect to timing,
type, and amount of gene product; mutation is the primary
source of novelty on which natural selection acts; and herita-
bility, or the proportion of population variance in a trait that
can be attributed to genetic variation, gives a good indication
of the extent to which these genetic processes have their ways
with us. Without acknowledgment, this interpretation again
relies on Fisher’s assumptions that gene actions are indepen-
dent of each other and of the environment. When the synthe-
sis was developed, the causes of psychopathology and psy-
chological traits (more generally) were considered to be
completely environmental in origin, so the involvement of
genetic influences was considered to be minimal in this inter-
pretation. However, 50 years of twin, adoption, and family
studies have convinced the field of the involvement of genetic
influences in psychological function and dysfunction. This
has neither disrupted the predominant interpretation of their
meaning nor created widespread acknowledgment of its reli-
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ance on the assumptions about the independence of individ-
ual gene actions. The assumption that this interpretation is
correct underlies the current methods most commonly used
to search for the specific genes involved.
A Coexisting Alternative Perspective
Embryologists and evolutionary biologists have taken a
somewhat different view for a long time. They have focused
on the premise of the modern evolutionary synthesis that evo-
lution acts on the traits actually expressed, the phenotypes, ra-
ther than the genotypes as Dawkins (1976) argued in the ex-
treme. Selection on the phenotype implies that selectable
variation is phenotypic variation, regardless of its source
(Mayr, 1963; West-Eberhard, 2005). Selection is merely dif-
ferential reproductive success; only if the organisms under se-
lection are somehow genetically adapting the features under
selection to respond to it is genetic variation among them is
involved. This might sound like a mere semantic distinction,
but it is not. Organisms develop over time: none of their phe-
notypes springs forth in mature form from conception, and all
phenotypes emerge through some kind of genetically (and
environmentally) influenced developmental program. If phe-
notypes, rather than genotypes, are the objects of selection,
then novel phenotypesmight result from the impact on their de-
velopment of new environmental conditions and through new
genetic material (mutation), which is the mechanism assumed
by most geneticists. Among other things, this alternative per-
spective can help to explain high conservation of genetic mate-
rial across species with major morphological differences.
This perspective can also help to explain the maintenance of
individual differences within species and ultimately psychopa-
thology. If populations vary genetically and environmentally
and their members are developmentally plastic, then these
members will be differentially responsive to the varying envi-
ronmental inputs. The environmental inputs to any one gene
can include the actions of other genes, including genes that
vary within the species and those that do not. That is, environ-
mental or genetic (or both) novelties might modify the internal
environments of other genes, creating new phenotypic elements
within cells. In turn, these new phenotypic elements might
provide input to higher organizational levels of the organism,
altering the developmental program so that quite different
surface-level traits emerge.
A famous two-legged goat reported by the Dutch mor-
phologist Slijper (1942) can help to illustrate the processes in-
volved. The goat was born with a congenital defect of the
forelegs, of unknown source, which made it impossible for
these legs to support its weight. It adapted by learning to
walk and run on its hind legs alone. After its accidental death,
Slijper dissected it. He documented extensive differences
from normal goats in the bones of the hind legs, extensive
modifications of the pelvis and thoracic skeleton, major dif-
ferences in the arrangement of small tendons in the leg mus-
cles, and a greatly thickened and elongated gluteal tongue.
Whatever caused the abnormality of the front legs apparently
acted as a kind of switch mechanism, launching a cascade of
correlative adaptive changes in behavior, muscle, and bone.
Similar changes have been reported in other normally quad-
ruped animals trained or forced to walk upright (West-Eber-
hard, 2005), and Slijper (1942) and others have suggested
that the emergence of bipedalism in humans might not have
been as difficult an evolutionary step as has been commonly as-
sumed. The anatomical features allowing adaptation to bipedal
running in humans are similar to those that were altered in the
bipedal goat (Bramble & Lieberman, 2004), making it likely
that developmental plasticity contributed to the anatomical
changes that made human bipedal walking and running normal.
This kind of developmental recombination (West-Eberhard,
2003, 2005), or reuse of the same genes to produce different
phenotypes in different environments or the presence of differ-
ent genes (or both), has been observed within and across many
species. To understand how it takes place, think of develop-
ment as a network of events, some internal to the organism
and some external, some occurring simultaneously and inde-
pendently, and some (if not most or all) dependent to some de-
gree on the occurrence of one or many prior events. Each inter-
nal event is governed by a regulatory process; if the regulatory
process is altered, so can be the event. Developmental recom-
bination implies alteration of some regulatory process that
simultaneously dictates an alteration in the event dependent
on it. That is, it is impossible to have an altered phenotypewith-
out some alteration in its developmental pathway. With respect
to gene expression, this means that some set of preexisting
genes is now expressed in a different combination or context
(or both), and this might include the expression of genes that
have heretofore been silent. With complex polygenic traits
such as psychopathology, it is extremely likely that there will
be genetic variation in the response to the triggering event so
that any particular eventmight trigger developmental modifica-
tions in one individual but not another. Moreover, many differ-
ent genes are probably involved in the differences in response.
Developmental recombination can fuel evolutionary change
through genetic accommodation, which, in the general sense, is
change in the population frequency of any combination of the
genes that affect the regulation of a novel trait (Waddington,
1953). If the novel trait resulting from developmental recombi-
nation is under selection or even can persist as an alternative
adaptive phenotype, the selection will drive the frequencies
of the genes involved in the recombination to new levels that
accommodate the altered developmental process and its novel
phenotype. Even if the trait is not adaptive but its development
is triggered by a commonly occurring environmental circum-
stance, it will persist in the population at a level that reflects
the frequency of occurrence of the triggering circumstance. Al-
though at some level genetic variation is impossible without
mutation, genetic accommodation is not dependent on the
presence of mutation. Genetic variation is ubiquitous: virtually
every trait subjected to selection shows a response (West-Eber-
hard, 2003), and many show the ability to reverse the direction
of response even after long periods of selection (e.g., Hill,
2005). This suggests the presence of considerable reservoirs
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of genetic variation that remain untapped until called upon by
environmental circumstances broadly defined to include the
surrounding genotype. There is considerable and growing evi-
dence for these reservoirs (Gibson & Dworkin, 2004). The
dominant perspective has been that genes are leaders in adap-
tive evolution and phenotypic development in the individual,
but this alternative perspective casts them distinctly in the
role of followers (West-Eberhard, 2005).
Developmental and Evolutionary Principles
Underlying Developmental Recombination According
to Schmalhausen
Many years ago, evolutionary biologists discerned basic prin-
ciples on which developmental recombination must rest. One
of the most articulate scientists in this regard was Ivan Ivano-
vich Schmalhausen (1884–1963). His works are not as well
known as they should be because he was Russian and ran
afoul of the Stalinist political climate in the aftermath of
World War II, which cost him his academic posts. He contin-
ued his work in relative isolation and was able to send his book
Factors of Evolution (Schmalhausen, 1946) to Theodosius
Dobzhansky in the United States, who had it translated into
English. Using data from extensive empirical studies, Schmal-
hausen proposed that evolution operates on the organism as a
whole; thus, the organism’s development is oriented toward in-
tegration and mutual adaptation of all parts and functions,
which provides general stability to the system. This was in con-
trast to the prevailing neo-Darwinian view of the organism as
the sum of its independent genetically determined characteris-
tics and evolution as a process of differentiating among these
characteristics (Levit, Hossfeld, & Olsson, 2006).
Schmalhausen acknowledged and discussed the situation
in which the environment (ecosystem or biogeocenosis; Levit
et al., 2006) is changing rapidly and permanently and an or-
ganism’s developmental mechanisms are confronted with
new circumstances to which it must adapt or perish. This sit-
uation results, he said, in a shift in the population distribution
of characteristics and a new mean norm(s), but he focused his
attention on the more common situation in which environ-
mental circumstances and populations that manifest variance
in characters exist in dynamic equilibrium, with environ-
mental circumstances varying over time in some recurring
(e.g., cyclic) form. In such conditions, he said, developmental
processes tend to acquire greater stability, or independence
from external factors and from genetic variation that influ-
ences developmental differences. This independence from
the environment takes place through selection against genetic
variants that cannot sustain normal development. It is more
important that they occur through optimizing development
by increasing the regulatory complexity so that there is
more redundancy of genetic functions, making the emergence
of normal characteristics more durable and minimizing the
extent to which such characteristics can be modified in non-
heritable and potentially nonadaptiveways by particular envi-
ronmental circumstances via reducing expression of genetic
variance. The reduction of the expression of genetic variance
can take place through selection against particular genetic
variants, but it can take place more directly through the si-
lencing of their expression through regulatory processes. In
biological circumstances, it is generally impossible to distin-
guish between rapid and permanent changes in the environ-
ment and recurring environmental variations. Thus, the
emergence of new mean norms is generally taking place
simultaneously with the stabilization of developmental pro-
cesses and its accompanying reductions in variance.
It is important that, according to Schmalhausen, genetic
variation allowing modification of characteristics remains,
whether through mutation or failure of such variation to per-
turb development under prevailing environmental circum-
stances. When such modification does occur, it is not always
adaptive. Schmalhausen did not consider it abnormal, how-
ever, unless its form precluded attainment of maturity
(1946). Modifications affect interrelations amongmany phys-
iological processes with their own morphological expres-
sions, and the transactions among them may intensify growth
or accelerate differentiation (or both). Where the transactions
are hierarchical, in the sense that one is dependent on the pre-
occurrence of another, they might have deterministic effects.
Any morphogenetic manifestation of these modifications
arises from these developmental interactions.
To summarize Schmalhausen’s (1946) principles, devel-
opmental stability is maintained in populations and indi-
viduals within populations through the following:
Principle 1: Diploidy, or the presence of two copies of each
genetic locus, one from each parent
Principle 2:Genetic redundancy and the presence of wide, in-
terconnected genetic networks
Principle 3: Genetic reserve or unexpressed genetic variation
Principle 4: Specificity of the phenotype as emergent from
the genotype as a whole, in the context of the environment;
individual genes have at most modifying effects.
Principle 5: Flexible expression of genetic products
Principle 6: Specificity of reaction, which is determined by
the condition of the tissue rather than by any deterministic
process of generating the tissue
Principle 7: Flexibility in timing of maturation of activating
and reacting tissue
Physiological reactions to environmental perturbations are
generally quickly reversible when environmental conditions
permit, enabling active adaptation. However, physiological
reactions become involved in more permanent development
through conditioned responses, learning, memory, experi-
ence, and culture. Cells and their characteristics are not inher-
ited directly. Development proceeds through an individual
superstructure that is established anew in each individual as
a chain of reactions induced by external factors. These exter-
nal factors are less significant the more complex the organism
because the associated physiological regulatory systems in
more complex organisms have greater environmental buffer-
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ing systems with respect to the ability to reach reproductive
maturity, which give internal conditions increased impor-
tance in permitting development to occur.
Schmalhausen’s Law
These basic evolutionary principles led Schmalhausen to in-
fer an important means of tying together evolutionary and de-
velopmental biology through individual and population re-
sponse to stress. He proposed that, when a population finds
itself in extreme or unusual conditions with respect to any
one aspect of its existence, it is more vulnerable to small dif-
ferences in any other aspect (Lewontin & Levins, 2000). This
would occur because the perturbing forces on development
set in motion by the extreme circumstances ripple across
the interrelated processes, undermining the stability to which
they have evolved by forcing the expression of alternative ge-
netic mechanisms to achieve particular developmental mile-
stones and allowing the expression of typically silenced genes
that have their own consequences. In turn, this destabilization
of developmental processes makes the population more sen-
sitive to other, less extreme variations in environmental cir-
cumstances, launching a cascade of effects that vary consid-
erably from individual to individual within the population.
Thus, variance in characteristics within a population is not
simply noise but, at least when examined over time or in dif-
ferent environmental circumstances, an indication of the ex-
tent to which the population is under stress.
This expresses Schmalhausen’s law at the level of the pop-
ulation, but what about at the level of the individual? The
population-level statement suggests that, when any given in-
dividual within the population is under stress with respect to
one aspect of life (regardless of the overall population circum-
stances), that individual is more vulnerable to small stressors
on other aspects of life, and the specific manifestations of vul-
nerability may differ considerably from the overt external
source of the stress. This is consistent, for example, with
the common observation that people are more likely to get
a minor cold or flu when under work or personal stress. Ap-
plied to individuals, the population-level statement also sug-
gests that individual vulnerability to any particular form of
stress will tend to vary, as will the particular manifestations
of that vulnerability. In many ways, this restates the well-
known stress–diathesis model of disease, but it explicitly rec-
ognizes the dependence of any character manifestation on
developmental processes: each step in any developmental
process is an activation or inhibition of the next gene action
in the process, the presence of genetic redundancy as a stabi-
lizing mechanism, and the presence of underlying genetic
variation that is in most circumstances unexpressed.
An Experimental Result Related to Schmalhausen’s
Principles
All of these features are topics of current discussion and in-
vestigations of specific mechanisms in evolutionary and de-
velopmental genetics. A century-long corn-breeding experi-
ment best encapsulates Schmalhausen’s perspicacity and
how the paradigm that has dominated genetics over that pe-
riod has overlooked his principles. In this experiment, geneti-
cists at the University of Illinois examined corn’s response to
selection for oil content (Hill, 2005; Laurie et al., 2004).
Quantification of the response to selection that could be ex-
pected from agricultural breeding experiments was the
original motivation for development of the concept of herita-
bility. For example, if only those plants or livestock that are at
least 1 standard deviation above the mean on some trait are
allowed to reproduce, the standardized difference between
the mean in the original generation and the mean in the off-
spring generation is heritability. Of course, such manipula-
tions are not possible with humans, but heritability can also
be quantified by comparing the extent of trait similarity in
pairs of relatives to extent of their genetic relationship. Psy-
chologists have made extensive use of this, especially in sam-
ples of mono- and dizygotic twins, to establish that effec-
tively all psychological traits are heritable to some degree
(Turkheimer, 2000).
In any agricultural breeding experiment, geneticists have
theorized that the offspring generation is more genetically
homogeneous than the original and thus unable to produce
as much genetic variance. They also theorized that, if they
continued with any such experiment, over time all of the ge-
netic variance would be eliminated, leaving only genes fixed
for the selected level of the trait. The corn-breeding experi-
ment was designed to demonstrate these propositions in ac-
tion. The researchers could not control the seasonal variation
experienced by the corn, but it was all planted in the same
area and cared for in the same way. Figure 1 (see supplemen-
tary material in Hill, 2005) shows the corn’s response to se-
lection over time. Upward and downward selection were
Figure 1. Corn’s response to selection over time from a corn-breeding experi-
ment. Adapted from “A century of corn selection,” by W. G. Hill, 2005, Sci-
ence, 307, supplementalmaterial. Copyright 2005 by the AmericanAssociation
for the Advancement of Science. Adapted with permission. [A color version of
this figure can be viewed online at http://journals.cambridge.org/dpp]
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both practiced. That is, only those producing oil in the highest
20% were selected (IHO) in one line of plants, whereas only
those plants producing oil in the lowest 20% were selected
(ILO) in another line. Fifty years into the experiment, selec-
tion on some of those plants that had been selected for the
past 50 years for high oil content was reversed, so that they
were selected for low oil content (RHO) and vice versa for
some of those plants that had been selected for low oil content
(RLO). Five years after that, selection was reversed again for
some of those that had been selected initially for high and
then for low oil content (SHO).
The results in Figure 1 surprised geneticists. The slopes of
the lines in the figure indicate the response to selection or her-
itability, which the researchers estimated at 96% after appro-
priate transformations of scale (Laurie et al., 2004). Geneti-
cists had expected a strong initial response to selection that
would slow with time as genetic variance was eliminated, re-
sulting in curves in the figure that were steep at first and
leveled off toward some almost fixed aymptotic oil content
over time. Some genetic variation was presumed to always re-
main because of mutation. Instead, the response to selection
appeared to be steady (except for sporadic fluctuations, prob-
ably due mostly to variation in yearly changes in seasonal
characteristics) and showed no sign of leveling off to date (ex-
cept where it generated no oil content at all in the downward
selected line about 85 years into the experiment, and the corn
was no longer viable). When selection was reversed 50 years
into the experiment, it was even more surprising that, at a time
when prevailing theory predicted that considerable reduction
in genetic variance should have occurred, response to selec-
tion was effectively the same as before, but just in the oppo-
site direction. As we currently understand them, mutation
rates cannot account for the depth and consistency of these re-
sponses to selection; they are simply far too low (Le Rouzic,
Siegel, & Carlborg, 2007).
This means that there must be considerable redundancy in
the genes that can contribute to oil production in corn, consis-
tent with Schmalhausen’s summary Principle 2. Moreover,
these genes must be expressed with respect to oil production
against some genetic backgrounds but not others, suggesting
some reserve of potential genetic expression consistent with
Schmalhausen’s summary Principle 3. Clearly, expression
of the genes that produce corn oil is flexible, consistent
with Schmalhausen’s summary Principle 5. Given the long-
term pervasiveness and flexibility of the response to selec-
tion, the effects of any one gene must be at most modifying,
consistent with Schmalhausen’s summary Principle 5. Oil pro-
duction in corn is a continuous, polygenic trait, and corn sur-
vives well with a broad range of oil production levels. This is
exactly what we would expect if oil production emerges in a
flexible manner from the genotype as a whole in the context
of the environment and the actual level of the phenotype
emerges as a product of the cells already produced rather than
as a genetically predetermined product, consistent with the
rest of Schmalhausen’s summary principles. That geneticists
have been surprised by Figure 1 suggests that the predominant
explanatory paradigm has been inadequate and could have
benefited from greater focus on Schmalhausen’s ideas.
Facilitated Variation and Cryptic Genetic Variation
Some current geneticists are discussing concepts analogous
to those of Schmalhausen and using them to explain phenom-
ena such as those in Figure 1. Two of these concepts seem
particularly worthy of exposition. The first is “facilitated var-
iation” as discussed by Gerhart and Kirschner (2007). Clearly
influenced by Schmalhausen, Gerhart and Kirschner accept
that genetic variation arises from the sources of mutation
and genomic rearrangements, arranged in new combinations
by sexual reproduction, consistent with the standard para-
digm. However, they propose that acceptance of these new
combinations in a population is facilitated because the new
genetic variants lead to changes in the actions of preexisting
regulatory genes, which in turn impact what they regulate, or
the set of conserved core networks of development and phys-
iology, resulting in the emergence of new traits. Thus, new
traits require little in the way of actual genetic change and in-
stead rely primarily on regulatory and developmental altera-
tions. The net result of the combination of flexibility of regu-
latory response and regulatory buffering mechanisms is
preservation of and even increase in genetic variation within
the population, some of which is maintained unexpressed un-
less demanded by environmental circumstances.
The modern label for this present but unexpressed genetic
variation is “cryptic genetic variation” (Gibson & Dworkin,
2004). Its existence has been well documented in model or-
ganisms such as Drosophila melanogaster, yeast, Arabidop-
sis thaliana, and mice. Again, the original experimental doc-
umentation of cryptic genetic variation dates back over 50
years and is considered classic. Despite this, its implications
have not been incorporated into mainstream scientific think-
ing about genetic influences on human behaviors and condi-
tions. The original experiments demonstrating its existence
were carried out by Waddington (1953). Fruit flies (Droso-
phila melanogaster) have veins in their wings. Most of the
veins run lengthwise through the wings, but most fruit flies
have some that run cross-wise, linking the otherwise gener-
ally parallel veins. However, a specific genetic variant pro-
duces flies that have wings with no cross-veins. Some flies
will also develop without cross-veins if they receive 4 hr of
treatment with 408C heat at 21–23 hr in pupal development.
Waddington selectively bred flies for and against production
of cross-veins in response to heat treatment. After 14 genera-
tions, some of the flies in the line that were selected for the
absence of cross-veins had no cross-veins even without the
heat treatment. Waddington continued to selectively breed
for the absence of cross-veins until a high proportion of the
flies in this line were cross-vein-less even without heat treat-
ment. What had been an environmentally triggered condition
had become a routinely expressed trait attributable to expres-
sion of genes whose expression, at least in this form, had been
suppressed in prior generations. Waddington was able to es-
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tablish that the cross-vein-less trait being expressed was poly-
genic rather than due to any single mutation, even though the
original observation of the cross-vein-less trait could be at-
tributed to a single genetic variant.
Cryptic genetic variation is increasingly considered a po-
tentially important element in organismic response to muta-
tional and environmental perturbation. This is because cryp-
tic genetic variation can act to buffer the effects of these
perturbations, thus protecting the organism from the kind of
disruption of physiological homeostasis that, as Schmalhau-
sen suggests, leads to diseasewhen it persists over time. How-
ever, cryptic genetic variation can also contribute to the very
disruption that leads to disease when expression of destabiliz-
ing genetic variance is triggered. Many psychopathological
and physical diseases appear to emerge over a threshold of
some form of dysregulation from which the organism cannot
recover, and current theories suggest that this is attributable to
failure to maintain homeostasis in response to stress (Mc-
Ewen, 2007). Many chronic psychopathological and physical
diseases also have far-reaching effects on many organ sys-
tems, suggesting exactly the sort of emergence of the pheno-
type from the genotype as a whole that Schmalhausen de-
scribed, rather than from a major malfunction of any one
particular genetic mechanism. It is perhaps even more telling
that many of these conditions appear to be quite heteroge-
neous. That is, the criteria used to diagnose them are rather
varied, so that two individuals meeting them could lack
even a single overlapping specific symptom. For example, a
diagnosis of major depressive disorder in DSM-IV-TR re-
quires a depressed mood and/or substantial loss of interest
or pleasure in activities over a period of at least 2 weeks, as
well as the presence of at least four of seven other somatic
or psychological symptoms. However, some of the somatic
symptoms are expressed as either a positive or a negative dis-
turbance of normal patterns, so that, for example, either an in-
crease or decrease in appetite can be a symptom. Even where
symptoms overlap, developmental trajectories often appear to
differ considerably among individuals receiving a common
diagnosis (Butcher, Mineka, & Hooley, 2009), suggesting ra-
ther different genetic and environmental etiologies even
within conditions receiving single diagnostic labels.
Beyond Schmalhausen’s Principles: Mechanisms
of Manifestation in the Environment
Given that the environment has its effects on the phenotype as
a whole, genetic response is flexible, individuals vary geneti-
cally in their responses to environmental circumstances, envi-
ronmental perturbations inevitably interrupt developmental
processes of some kind, and there is considerable genetic var-
iation present but unexpressed, what should we expect about
how genetically varying individuals function within popula-
tions experiencing variation in many but not necessarily all
environmental conditions? Schmalhausen’s (1946) principles
addressed this in general terms, but I make the basic concepts
he articulated more explicitly relevant to human circum-
stances in modern society through the enumeration of several
additional principles.
Principle 8:When presented with adverse environmental cir-
cumstances, or even the prospect of them, mobile organisms
such as humans move to avoid them. Those most sensitive to
the circumstances and those most able to do so move first and
farthest. This creates population genetic stratification and
gene–environment correlation and links gene–environment
correlation and interaction (Johnson, 2007). Specific genetic
variants associated with the ability to avoid adverse circum-
stances become more frequent in more benign environments
because movement is easier, as do specific genetic variants
associated with sensitivity to adverse conditions because
there are relatively few adverse conditions to challenge
them. The two sorts of genetic variants may or may not over-
lap. Mobile organisms move toward positive environmental
circumstances, with analogous consequences.
Principle 9: Those most sensitive to adverse circumstances
may not be those most able to avoid them, and those most
able to avoid them may not be those most sensitive to them.
Thus, the correlations between genes and environment will
always be incomplete. Given considerable genetic redun-
dancy, developmental plasticity and stability, and small ef-
fects of most individual genetic loci, we should not expect
to be able to detect population genetic stratification by exam-
ining specific genetic loci.
Principle 10: For complex organisms like humans who live in
complex environments, adverse circumstances to one individ-
ual may not be adverse to another, and the ability to avoid ad-
verse circumstances may be specific to certain kinds of cir-
cumstances. Moreover, humans in particular have multiple
goals and motivations (both conscious and unconscious),
and they may consciously or unconsciously elect to remain
in circumstances that cause stress with respect to one or
more goals because the overall environment advances prog-
ress toward meeting other goals. Thus, movements of indi-
viduals within populations will vary with specific circum-
stances, sensitivities to those circumstances, abilities to
move toward or away from them, and competing individual
goals and motivations.
Principle 11:When the main effects of adverse environmental
circumstances are strong enough and consistent enough across
individuals, they increase or decrease mean trait levels (as rel-
evant) and can suppress genetic and/or environmental sources
of variance in the population. When such main effects are
weaker and less consistent, they have smaller effects on
mean levels and release otherwise unexpressed genetic and/
or environmental variance only in the most sensitive, generat-
ing greater genetic and/or environmental variance in the popu-
lation. Population means and variances are therefore intimately
connected and variance is not noise, exactly as Schmalhausen
suggested. Environmental effects with respect to any one gene
include expression of the other genes in the genome.
Principle 12: Sensitivity to environmental circumstances is
not necessarily an indication of more or less evolutionary fit-
Developmental genetics and psychopathology 1171
ness or even positive or negative adaptation to environmental
conditions. Depending on the nature of the sensitivity and the
kinds of environmental circumstances, the effects may be
positive or negative. The importance of the possibility of pos-
itive and negative effects of sensitivity has recently been dis-
cussed in terms of differential susceptibility to the environ-
ment (Ellis & Boyce, 2008, 2011; Ellis, Boyce, Belsky,
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2011).
Principle 11 needs some elaboration. It is common to con-
sider whether trait heritability varies systematically with dif-
ferences in environmental circumstances (e.g., Charmentier
& Garant, 2005). In such studies, investigators often try to in-
fer rules about whether heritability is likely to be higher or
lower in favorable or unfavorable environmental conditions.
However, heritability refers to the ratio of genetic to total var-
iance, consisting classically of the sum of genetic and shared
familial and nonshared environmental variance components.
Thus, heritability could increase because genetic variance
alone increased, because environmental variance alone de-
creased, or as a result of some combination of changes in ge-
netic and environmental variance components; and heritabil-
ity could increase while genetic variance decreased, and vice
versa. In Principle 11, I refer not to changes in heritability,
but to changes in the raw genetic and/or environmental var-
iance components. Moreover, the principle refers to the
strength of the effects on the mean rather than to whether
the environmental circumstances are adverse or not. Our
judgment of the quality of the environmental circumstances
is irrelevant.
Using Schmalhausen’s Law and Attendant Principles
to Understand Human Psychopathology
How can we use Schmalhausen’s law and the attendant prin-
ciples to understand how genes are involved in human psy-
chopathology? It makes sense to think about this from two
perspectives: psychopathology as manifested in the individ-
ual and psychopathology as manifested in the population. I
begin with a discussion of individual manifestation.
Individual manifestation of psychopathology
Following Schmalhausen’s conceptualization, first, we need
to think of the environment as acting on individuals as pheno-
typic, observable wholes that are continually undergoing in-
ternal developmental processes whose regulation can respond
flexibly to environmental circumstances. Second, we need to
think of individuals as learning sponges, constantly con-
sciously and unconsciously orienting toward and absorbing
information from the environment. Third, we need to keep
in mind that individuals are continually responding to adapt
to the environment and initiating actions intended to progress
toward attainment of multiple goals that may conflict (Princi-
ples 8 and 10). Responsive and initiative actions may be un-
conscious as well as conscious, and the same is true of the
goals. Fourth, we also need to think of adaptation in the im-
mediate sense of getting the individual through the moment
and the longer-term sense of making accommodations to cir-
cumstances that have some permanence (Principles 8 and 9).
Fifth, we need to divorce our idea of adaptation from our
ideas of success and well-being in the social senses those
terms usually carry (Principle 12).
The theory of personality and personality disorder under-
lying cognitive therapy (Weishaar & Beck, 2006) provides a
helpful framework for this. According to this theory, person-
ality has its roots in evolution and its genetic influences in-
volve strategies that facilitate survival and reproductive suc-
cess through absorption and synthesis of information: those
learning sponges in action. Escape, self-defense, conserva-
tion of resources, display behavior, sexual attraction, and
bonding are all genetically influenced motivations activated
by relevant environmental stimuli (Principle 8); and their ac-
tivation involves response and initiation of goal-seeking be-
haviors (Principle 10). Motivations can be activated to differ-
ing degrees (Principle 10), allowing a flexible range of
responses to varying and changing environmental circum-
stances. Motivations form the basis for the ways in which
we use incoming information consciously and unconsciously
to make immediate responses and to formulate longer-term
plans of action (Principle 8). Our responses and plans of ac-
tion integrate cognitive, affective, behavioral, and emotional
systems (within the contexts of individual sensitivity to exter-
nal stimuli and ability to respond; Principle 9), and these sys-
tems in turn rely upon schemas (Beck, 1967) that develop
through experience over time (Mineka & Zinburg, 2006).
The schemas orient attention and process incoming data by
placing it in context with core beliefs and emotional response
patterns derived from past experiences (Principle 10). They
thus act as filters through which new stimuli are interpreted
and processed.
Schemas may be constructively functional or destructively
dysfunctional with respect to common definitions of social
functioning in modern society (Principle 12). In many situa-
tions, they simplify the process of determining appropriate re-
sponses to stimuli because they help the bearer to place the
stimuli in context. However, they can also inappropriately re-
strict our responses, so behavior is always the result of some
combination of schema-driven and flexible responses. During
psychological distress, flexibility is lost and responses be-
come increasingly schema driven, exactly as Schmalhausen
suggested. The individual is then at risk for inappropriately
applying schemas, resulting in errors in perception and dys-
functional behavior. If the distress continues, a “cognitive
shift” away from normal processing takes place and cog-
nitive/emotional/motivational processing becomes “ener-
gized” (Beck, 1967) or dominated by one or a few schema,
so that everything is perceived through their lenses, again
consistent with the kinds of responses to stress that Schmal-
hausen posited. It is perhaps even more important that actions
relying on schemas may help the individual get through a par-
ticular situation (Principles 9 and 10); but they could under-
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mine successful adaptation over the longer term, for example,
when a child learns that she can deflect the pain of a drunken
parent’s abuse by biting her fingernails to the quick afterward.
Making the issue of successful adaptation even more com-
plex, adaptation may be successful given the environmental
circumstances in which a person lives or has lived but unsuc-
cessful according to commonly applied social definitions of
success (Principle 9), for example, when a child abused by
his parents develops a personality that avoids close social
contact with everyone, thus escaping further abuse but also
forgoing affection. In evolutionary science, this is termed
making use of alternative adaptive strategies. For example,
Troisi (2005) has proposed it with respect to antisocial per-
sonality and insecure attachment.
This loss of flexibility and increasing reliance on schema-
driven responses is consistent with both Schmalhausen’s law
and current understanding of the neurobiology of response to
stress in general (Ford, 2010; van der Kolk & d’Andrea,
2010). That is, prolonged existence in a state of low-grade
fear results in disruptions and biases in attentional focus, af-
fect regulation, processing of stimuli, and impulse control, the
very characteristics that enable flexible patterns of response.
One specific neurobiological aspect of this, sensory gating
(Freedman, 2010), can be used to clarify the kinds of mecha-
nisms involved. Information about external stimuli is con-
veyed to a few neurons in the hippocampus. These neurons
have axons linking with varying degrees of strength to
many other neurons within the hippocampus and they activate
these other neurons, which can in turn reactivate them, creat-
ing a map or network of associations characterizing the stim-
ulus situation. This map is based not only on the specific stim-
ulus situation but also on information from the memory stores
of the neocortex, in other words the relevant schemas. Sen-
sory gating refers to the spread of information among the neu-
rons. Because sensory gating depends on the strength of sy-
naptic transmission and sensitivity of synaptic reception
and many neuronal pathways are involved, a complete map
of the stimulus situation is generally not necessary to generate
a response. This has adaptive consequences such as when we
are able to recognize another person from behind, when we
can extrapolate the minimal available sensory data to con-
struct some form of image of the whole person, but it can
also have dysfunctional consequences when we jump to pre-
mature conclusions (Freedman, 2010).
Such dysfunctional consequences, or deficits in sensory
gating, can happen either because the spread of neuronal in-
formation does not go far enough because it gets trapped too
early in an inappropriate web of prior associations (a schema)
or because the spread of neuronal information is too diffuse
and reaches so far that it engages some only tenuously rele-
vant web(s) of prior associations. Deficits in sensory gating
have long been noted among people with schizophrenia.
This has motivated development of the understanding of
the sensory gating mechanisms as well as the search for genes
involved in sensory gating (Freedman, 2010). However,
problems with sensory gating are also associated with many
other forms of psychopathology, including bipolar disorder
(Olsson et al., 2010), insomnia (Hairson, Talbot, Eidelman,
Gruber, & Harvey, 2010), attention-deficit/hyperactivity dis-
order (Lane, Reynolds, & Thacker, 2010), obsessive–com-
pulsive disorder (de Leeuw, Oranje, van Megan, Kemner,
& Westenberg, 2010), and even interstitial cystitis/painful
bladder syndrome (Kilpatrick et al., 2010). It is possible
that these diverse manifestations of disorder arise as people
with different genetic backgrounds and environmental ex-
periences consciously and unconsciously adapt to less than
optimal sensory gating function. For example, people with
schizophrenia may develop paranoic delusions in a (likely
somewhat desperate) search for explanations for inappropri-
ately gated sensory perceptions, and they may go on to de-
velop flat affect and other symptoms of the disorder through
efforts to avoid the kinds of situations that trigger the misgat-
ings. In contrast, people with obsessive–compulsive disorder
may overlearn from one experience in which a commonly
experienced and unpleasant sensory gating problem was
avoided that they should repeat whatever they were doing at
that time in order to ward off the experience in the future.
These forms of adaptation may be accomplished through in-
dividualized moment-by-moment accommodation to circum-
stances (Principles 9 and 10), and thus they bear little resem-
blance to forms that would be more socially constructive over
the long run.
Of course, all of this takes place through gene action, be-
cause gene action is the basic mechanism of every biological
process in every organism. In sensory gating, some genetic
variants that predispose to problems have been identified, at
least in some families (Freedman, 2010). This is the way in
which genetic influences have been most commonly con-
strued: as involving the actions of genes that differ among hu-
mans, as with the sensory gating-related genes that have been
identified in some families. Some of these genes may be rare
and thus considered mutations. Others may be relatively com-
mon but functionally differentiated, so that their actions are
problematic against some but not all genetic backgrounds
or in some but not all environments. However, problematic
or disruptive gene action can also involve genes that all hu-
mans share. Schmalhausen’s principles and my extensions
apply to all genes, regardless of whether they differ among
humans or not.
Thus, within Schmalhausen’s framework, we can con-
ceive of much psychopathology as developing in the individ-
ual through the occurrence of some form of environmental
stress, some aspect of which captures the individual’s atten-
tion and from which the individual learns something (Mineka
& Zinburg, 2006) about his/her own responses to that stress
and the consequences of those responses. The stress is experi-
enced in the context of preexisting schemas formed through
previous experiences, whether those unique to the individual
or those common to many. It is important that it is not the ob-
jective level of environmental stress that matters so much, but
the subjective experience of it and the schematic web of asso-
ciations intowhich the aspect that captures the individual’s at-
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tention falls (Principle 10 and Ellis et al., 2011). For example,
a child who repeatedly experiences physical abuse at the
hands of a parent in a particular room of the house with a sin-
gle bare light bulb in the ceiling might develop anxiety attacks
in any room with a similar single bare light bulb. Or a child
who has come to look upon starting school as frightening
may misinterpret another child’s friendly overture as hostile
on the first day of school. If the child responds to the overture
with aggression that is in turn rejected by the other child and
punished by the teacher, the child is likely to feel that this is
unfair. If such scenarios are repeated or the one experience
was particularly salient to the child, the stage may be set
for the development of conduct disorder over time.
This is because each experience of stress also provides in-
formation that contributes to the elaboration of existing sche-
mas and the development of new ones, as the individual at-
tempts to avoid the stress yet also attempts to maintain
progress toward attainment of preexisting goals (Principles
8 and 9). These responses and actions amplify or restrict ex-
pression of the genes “nearest to hand,” which are those that
can be most readily pressed into service or suppressed to ac-
complish a response or initiate a behavior, regardless of
whether these are the genes that are optimally involved.
This is possible because of the genetic redundancy that con-
tributes to the stability of the developmental programs dis-
cussed above. In turn, the changes in genetic expression in-
volved in initial responses or actions can launch a cascade
of gene action in which expression of many genes responds
to the changes in expression of a few. These changes in
gene expression will inevitably involve genes that differ
among humans and those that do not, making the genetic re-
sponses, like the schemas, unique to any one individual in
their specific manifestations yet also including elements
that are common to many (Principle 11). The changes will
also inevitably involve humans’ conscious awareness of
much (although by far not all) of our inner experiences and
the propensity to seek and latch onto (often biased) causal ex-
planations for them that drives the formation of many of our
schemas. This awareness can contribute to the manifestation
of what we tend to think of as the symptomatology of psycho-
pathology, as the individual works to rationalize these inner
experiences, often in ways that add to the overall dysfunction.
For example, a child with attention-deficit/hyperactivity dis-
order who is repeatedly punished for not paying attention in
the school classroom may become angry and feel picked
on, which in the process adds overtly disruptive behavior to
the failures to pay attention in an attempt to exact retribution.
Despite the increase in overall dysfunction, this move may be
at some level adaptive if the child acquires a more stable sense
of self through it, even if as a “bad kid.”
It is important that conscious or unconscious conflicts be-
tween sources of stress and goals may contribute to the devel-
opment of disorder and the particular form it takes (Principles
9 and 10). That is, when the pursuit of a goal requires an indi-
vidual’s presence in environmental circumstances that cause
stress to him/her (regardless of whether the circumstances
cause stress to all), the individual who would otherwise
move to avoid them may stay and tolerate the adverse condi-
tions in order to attain the goal. This will require either some
kind of constructive adaptation to the adverse conditions that
reduces the individual’s ability to generate stress or the ongo-
ing state of arousal generated by the stress will lead to delete-
rious expression of other potentially not directly related ge-
netic vulnerabilities that may be reflected in either mental
or physical disorder. Thinking along these lines with respect
to the generation of physical illness has become common
(e.g., Lovallo, 2005; McEwen, 2007; Sapolsky, 1998):
many think of emotional stress as making one more likely
to catch colds and flu viruses or to suffer a heart attack or gas-
trointestinal disorder, but similar mechanisms may also con-
tribute to the particular form that psychopathology takes in
the individual (e.g., Little, 1998). This kind of process would
be a prototypical example of Schmalhausen’s law.
Indirect evidence supporting this kind of explanation of
genetic influences on psychopathology in the individual
comes from the observance that disruption of particular neu-
rological systems or neurochemicals is associated with many
different forms of disorder (e.g., the range of disorders show-
ing disruption of sensory gating; Freeman, 2010). Another
form of evidence comes from a recent study of the extent to
which gene transcript (expression) levels were coordinated
in various brain regions in groups with major depressive dis-
order and controls (Gaiteri, Guillox, Lewis, & Sibille, 2010).
Although expression of many genes showed no particular as-
sociations in either cases or controls, genes targeted because
they had been associated with depression or neuroticisim in
prior studies and because they are expressed in particular
brain regions involved in depression showed highly coordi-
nated transcription patterns in cases but not in controls, re-
flecting both consistent increases and consistent decreases
in transcription levels from those in the controls. Some of
these genes were ones that differ among humans, others not.
Manifestation of psychopathology in the population
Given Principle 11, we should expect to and do find that cer-
tain kinds of stress (environmental risk factors) are generally
associated with certain kinds of psychopathologies. At the
same time, we should expect to and do find that not everyone
who experiences any particular kind of stress succumbs to
psychopathology: resilience is widely observed as well.
Thus, we should expect somewhat weak main effects of
many risk factors on psychopathology and that these rather
weakmain effects are associated with greater genetic variance
associated with psychology. Although research in this area is
still relatively new, there is evidence that this is exactly what
we do observe. For example, family relationship problems,
academic failure, stressful life events, and antisocial peer af-
filiations are associated with antisocial behavior and sub-
stance abuse; Hicks, South, DiRago, Iacono, and McGue
(2009) found that genetic variance associated with those
problem behaviors was greater in the presence of those risk
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factors. Although I know of no study that has tested this, ge-
netic variance associated with psychopathology should be
smaller in the presence of really strong risk factors such as
overt child abuse or neglect, because resilience should be
much rarer.
As the sensory gating example makes clear, genetic sensi-
tivity to environmental risk of one kind may be associated
with many disorders in different individuals who are coming
from different experiential and genetic backgrounds. That is,
in the context of one kind of experience, in most individuals
such genetic sensitivity may generally contribute to one kind
of behavior that we label as disordered as the individuals cope
with both the triggering experience and the resulting physio-
logical disruption. In the context of another kind of experi-
ence, however, in most individuals the same disruptive
gene action may generally contribute to a different kind of
disordered behavior. At the same time, a genetic sensitivity
against one genetic background may result in one kind of be-
havior we label as disordered, whereas against another ge-
netic background no disordered behavior or a rather different
kind of disordered behavior may result (Principle 12). Such a
spread of effects of specific kinds of disruptive gene action
helps to explain the symptomatology shared among many di-
agnostic categories and the high level of comorbidity of diag-
noses in clinical cases (Borsboom, Cramer, Schmittmann,
Epskamp, & Woldorp, 2011). Adding to this complexity,
specific kinds of experiences may trigger the expression of
different genetic vulnerabilities in individuals with different
genetic and experiential backgrounds (Principles 10 and
11). If this is correct, we should expect that many diagnostic
categories include individuals who arrived at their disordered
conditions through rather different etiological and develop-
mental pathways (equifinality; von Bertalanffy, 1968) and
that even rather specific neurobiological disorders may be
manifested in different ways in different individuals, within
the contexts of their other characteristics (equipotential; Conk-
lin, 1933). Some of these pathways may be primarily genetic
in origin, whereas others may be completely environmental,
with others in between. This can help to explain the heteroge-
neity of symptomatology within diagnostic categories, as
well as the looseness of the boundaries between diagnostic
categories.
If this complex developmental view is correct, we should
also expect that much of the work that will be needed to sub-
stantiate either genetic or environmental effects and articulate
the processes involved may have to come from work with
model organisms. The ways that rats and flies have been
bred in the lab may contribute its own inferential difficulties
(Flint & Mackay, 2009), but the kinds of experimental con-
trols needed to demonstrate these kinds of complex response
patterns are generally not possible in humans. To date, such
processes have been well documented in model organisms.
For example, juvenile rats exposed to stress that was reflected
in heightened hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis activity
manifested greater risk-taking behavior compared to controls
not previously stressed when reexposed to stress while still ju-
veniles. In contrast, rats reexposed to stress only in adulthood
manifested less risk-taking and greater anxiety-related behav-
iors (Richter-Levin & Jacobson-Pick, 2010) compared to
controls not previously stressed. It would be premature for
us to infer that humans exposed to stress in childhood will
manifest an analogous contrast in response if reexposed to
stress in childhood versus adulthood, but it would be inap-
propriate for us to ignore the possibility that timing of stress
within a developmental context in humans may have pro-
found impact on which genes undergo changes in expression
patterns and therefore the specific kinds of psychopathology
that are more or less likely to ensue.
Where Do We Go From Here?
As noted in the introductory section, the purpose of this arti-
cle has been to introduce the idea that we need a shift in per-
spective on the meaning and interpretation of the existence of
genetic influences on psychopathology. Within genetic re-
search, large research efforts are currently devoted to identi-
fying the specific genes involved in psychopathology,
whether through main effects or interactions. These efforts
have tended to generate more heat than light, in the form of
associations that fail to replicate and that at best tend to ac-
count for only small proportions of variance in psychopathol-
ogy within the population. Concepts from evolutionary and
developmental biology that have been with us for a long
time, such as those articulated by Schmalhausen, suggest
that addressing this is not a matter of obtaining greater sample
sizes or increased SNP coverage of the genome or finding rare
but highly penetrant variants, but of rethinking what it means
for genes to influence behavior and adaptation. Schmalhau-
sen’s principles pinpoint the developmental response to pro-
longed stress that involves modification of gene expression
patterns as of fundamental importance in the manifestation
of observable characteristics, particularly those that involve
volitional actions. Breaking this statement into manageable
research components means tracing individual differences
in physiological and emotional response to given kinds of
stress, identifying the genes that undergo changes in expres-
sion patterns, and charting the terms and consequences of
those changes in expression. Genetic research is beginning
to move in this direction.
The fields of epidemiology and developmental psychol-
ogy have long pursued research traditions emphasizing envi-
ronmental responses. These traditions have been almost com-
pletely separate from, and even hostile to, those of geneticists,
even when all three fields were interested in the same disor-
ders. Epidemiologists and developmental psychologists
have recently been addressing the impact of stress, particu-
larly in the form of traumatic experiences in early life, on later
mental and physical health, which has become common in
epidemiology and developmental psychology (see, e.g., La-
nius, Vermetten, & Pain, 2010). This is a very positive trend.
It has provided considerable evidence that such trauma causes
interruption of normal neurological development with long-
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term or permanent consequences for cognitive and emotional
functioning in later life, along the lines of developmental sta-
bility within the context of adaptation and plasticity articu-
lated by Schmalhausen. However, the inference of causation
in these studies generally rests on the observation of differences
in brain structure or function between those who have experi-
enced stress and controls. That is, these studies have not gen-
erally even considered the possibility that there are genetic
differences in responses to stress, genetic differences that
could potentially be correlated with the presence in the sorts
of environments in which certain kinds of early life trauma or
stress are more common. It is not my intent to argue that genetic
influences actually do predispose some peoplemore than others
to experience poverty or maltreatment. I do argue that until we
objectively and rigorously test this possibility, we cannot rule it
out.
For example, Bremner et al. (2003) examined hippocam-
pal structure and function in three groups of women, those
who had experienced childhood sexual abuse and current
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), those who had experi-
enced childhood sexual abuse but did not have PTSD, and
those with neither abuse experience nor current PTSD. The
results indicated smaller hippocampal volume in the women
with PTSD and abuse experience relative to the other two
groups. An important control group was missing in this study:
women with PTSD but no sexual abuse history. It is difficult
to obtain such a group with respect to PTSD, because the di-
agnosis relies on the presence of some traumatic experience.
This problem does not exist with most psychopathologies.
Similar results were obtained in a similarly constructed study
of depression, for example (Vythilingam et al., 2002), for
which such a control group could and should have been in-
cluded in order to strengthen the causal inference. The omis-
sion matters: Gilbertson et al. (2007) observed that hippo-
campal volume and configural processing were reduced in
combat veterans with PTSD relative to combat veterans with-
out PTSD. Within this sample, however, co-twins not ex-
posed to combat and not suffering from PTSD showed hippo-
campal deficits similar to those of their combat-exposed
brothers with PTSD, suggesting that the deficits may have
predated both the combat exposure and the development of
PTSD. This would indicate a genetically influenced vulner-
ability to PTSD.
The stress that actually brings on expression of the genetic
vulnerability, if it exists, could occur completely randomly,
but it may also involve individual movement toward or failure
to attempt to avoid environments that in turn are associated
with traumatic experience. There may be many reasons for
the presence in a noxious environment, including but not lim-
ited to conflicting goals that suggest tolerance of the circum-
stances may be beneficial for other reasons and inability to
avoid the situation. Regardless, how the traumatic experience
is processed psychologically definitely involves individual
choice, whether conscious or unconconscious. This may be
at least as important as the actual traumatic experience itself
in the development of psychopathology and the specific
form it takes as the individual copes with the traumatic event,
its physiological sequelae, and the derailment the event has
created in progress toward the individual’s preexisting goals.
Schmalhausen’s principles and my extensions to them articu-
late both the kinds of transactions between genetic influences
and environmental experiences we should expect in the indi-
vidual and the kinds of social patterns of both function and
dysfunction we should expect. It would be ironic if the means
of productively uniting the largely independent genetically
and environmentally oriented research traditions had been ly-
ing at our feet for more than 50 years now. Let us pick up that
old hat and put it back on.
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